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1 INTRODUCTION 
As India, one of the leading emerging economies, continues to develop rapidly, its energy 
demand grows apace. The energy sector holds the key to accelerating the country’s 
economic growth; inadequate supply of energy results in economic stagnation and, in turn, 
suboptimal development. In spite of over six decades of policies and programmes aimed at 
providing energy security to rural India, it continues to depend predominantly on such low-
efficiency fuels as firewood and other forms of biomass energy, and kerosene; availability 
and use of modern forms of energy such as electricity and cooking gas remain limited. 
Improving access to modern energy remains a key development challenge for the country 
and can play a critical role in improving social and economic well-being of its rural 
population. 
 
With this very intention, in 2001/02, the Government of India pledged to provide ‘electricity 
for all by 2012’—a target later extended to 2017. To meet the target, two key ministries of the 
central government, namely the Ministry of Power (MoP) and the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy (MNRE), launched several programmes including flagship national 
programme for rural electrification, namely RGGVY, the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran 
Yojana, launched in 2005.  
 
Although RGGVY had managed to extend grid infrastructure to most of the census villages 
by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2007–2012), adequate and reliable power supply 
remains a distant dream. The failure has been attributed mainly to the wide gap between 
demand and supply, currently more than 10%, despite huge capacity addition in the last two 
decades. In parallel with RGGVY, MNRE launched the Remote Village Electrification 
Programme (RVEP) and the Village Electricity Security Programme (VESP), both aimed at 
providing electricity to remote villages with small-scale off-grid renewable energy 
technologies. 
    Source: Census of India, 2011, Household Amenities 
In 2009, to provide electricity to villages and hamlets that are beyond the reach of the 
conventional grid, MoP launched the Decentralized Distributed Generation (DDG) Scheme 
as part of RGGVY. The scheme aims at identifying developers who will meet the electricity 
requirements of such villages and hamlets sustainably for five years and selecting those who 
require the least funding assistance. Since the inception of the scheme, 276 projects have 
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been sanctioned in different parts of the country. Of these projects, 48 are based on biomass 
energy whereas the rest are based on solar PV. However, the developers for a majority of 
these projects are the state nodal agencies, although the scheme has specific provisions to 
attract and encourage developers from the private sector. So far, fewer than a dozen projects, 
mainly small SPV-based projects– all of them in Andhra Pradesh – have been implemented 
on the ground. The current state of projects approved and implemented under the DDG 
scheme raises a larger question: Why has the scheme received such poor response despite a 
large sum (Rs 5400 million) being earmarked exclusively for providing implementation 
support? This report presents the findings of a study that sought to answer the question and 
offers a solution in the form of suitable modifications to the guidelines drawn up by the 
DDG scheme—modifications that, it is hoped, will attract developers from the private sector. 
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2 RURAL ELECTRIFCATION: A REVIEW OF POLICY 
AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
To bridge the widening demand–supply gap, the Government of India has taken a number 
of measures and launched a number of schemes for rural electrification from time to time. 
Two milestone measures are the Electricity Act, 2003 and the Rural Electrification Policy, 
published in 2006. This section provides a brief overview and analysis of select schemes, 
policies, and programmes as well as the key enabling provisions under the prevailing 
regulatory framework for rural electrification in India as a basis for developing innovative 
business models involving the private sector in rural electrification in future for effective 
large-scale deployment of decentralized power generation. 
 
2.1 Evolution of Rural Electrification in India 
 
India’s rural electrification programme was initiated in the 1950s, and its evolution can be 
divided into five distinctive stages. 
 
 
 
 
The definition of village electrification has changed with time in an effort to make the 
definition more meaningful to the ultimate goal of providing electricity to all. With the 
emergence of renewable energy, MNRE also implemented several programmes to promote 
cleaner and renewable energy technologies such as solar, biomass, and biogas for providing 
electricity to remote un-electrified villages and hamlets to support rural electrification 
through grid extension. The major programmes include VESP (which focused on biomass-
based technologies), RVEP (which shifted its focus with time to solar home lighting), and the 
recently launched Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM).  
 
 
 
Stage 1
•1950s:-
Providing 
electricity as 
a social 
amenity
Stage 2
•1960s:-
Focus 
shifted to 
energisation 
of 
agriculture 
pumpsets to 
enhance 
food 
security
Stage 3
•1980s:-
Seen as tool 
for 
correcting 
regional in-
equalities
Stage 4
•1990s:-
Setback due 
to 
deteriorating 
financial 
conditions of 
State 
Electricity 
Boards; 
more 
emphasis on 
efficiency 
than 
coverage
Stage 5
•21st 
century:-
Electrificatio
n of 
household 
became 
more 
important 
than that of 
villages. 
Renewable 
energy 
started to 
gain 
attention 
because of 
energy 
security.
•Focus on 
launching 
Rural 
Electrificatio
n Policy & 
RGGVY 
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Prior to October 1997           
village was classified as 
electrified                                             
'if electricity is being used 
within its revenue area for any 
purpose whatsoever'
In 1997                                
modified to provide for use of 
electricity                     
"electricity is used in 
inhabited locality within 
revenue boundary for any 
purpose whatsoever"
In 2004                                                          
further modified & expanded                       
Basic infrastructure such as distribution 
transformer & lines are provided in 
inhabited locality as well as basti/hamlet 
where it exists also provided in public places 
like schools, health centres, etc.                        
10% of total no. of households must be 
electrified
 
Evolving definition of Village Electrification 
Major Rural Electrification Programmes 
 
  Minimum Needs Programme 
 Started in 5th FYP (1974-79) with SEB as implementing agency  
 100% central assistance to states in the form of grants and loans for last mile connectivity 
 Targeted states with village electrification lower than national average 
 Discontinued in 2004-05 because of lack of response from States 
Kutir Jyoti Programme 
 Initiated in 1988-89 with 100% grant with SEB as implementing agency 
 Single point connection to BPL households (71.7 lacs BPL household connected in 16 years) 
 Merged with AREP in 2004 and later with RGGVY 
Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana (PMGY) 
 Launched in 2000-2001 with funding as additional central assistance (90% grant and 10% loans for special category states, 
30% grant and 70% loan for other states)  
 Funding provided for minimum services in rural areas (health, education, drinking water and electrification etc) through 
implementing agencies viz SEBs, electricity departments, power utilities 
 Flexibility to states to decide on inter-allocation amongst basic services  
 Discontinued from 2005 
Accelerated Rural Electrification Programme (AREP) 
 Launched in 2002 with 4% interest subsidy from financial institutions like REC,PFC, RIDF, NABARD, etc 
 Implementing agency: state government through electricity board and power utilities 
 Applicable on loans given through PFC/REC and NABARD 
Accelerated electrification of 1 lakh villages and 1 crore households 
 Launched in 2004 with 40% capital subsidy and 60% loan 
 AREP and Kutir  Jyoti schemes merged with this and later with RGGVY 
Remote Village Electrification Programme (RVEP) 
 MNRE’s programme to electrify all remote census villages & hamlets through renewable energy sources 
 Aimed at bringing benefits of electricity to people living in most backward and deprived regions.  
 Cumulative sanctions of villages and hamlets since its inception reached around 12,369 (31/12/2011)  
Village Energy Security Programme (VESP) 
 Launched by MNRE with WB-TA in 2005 with pilot phase of about 80 test villages 
 Objective to go beyond electrification, provide total energy security (lighting, cooking, & motive power) 
 Focus on exploitation of locally available renewable resource with involvement of local community by transforming 
locally available biomass energy use in rural remote areas in a sustainable manner. 
 However, after the closure of the pilot phase in 2009-10 most of the project became redundant, and therefore non-
operational, as soon as grid reached the village. 
Guidelines for Off-Grid & Decentralized Solar Applications 
 JNNSM was launched in 2010 as one of eight national missions under NAPCC announced in 2008. 
 Twin objectives: contributing to India's long-term energy security & its ecologically sustainable growth 
 MNRE, as a part of JNNSM, has launched a scheme to promote off grid application of solar energy.  
 Focuses on promotion of off-grid and decentralized systems, including hybrid systems to meet lighting, electricity and 
heating/cooling requirements.  
 First phase, scheduled to be completed by 2013, has a target of 200MW off-grid capacity installation 
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2.2 Enabling Regulatory Framework: Provisions under the Electricity 
Act, 2003 
 
Enactments prior to the Electricity Act, 2003 (EA 2003 or ‘the Act’) had no specific provisions 
for promotion of renewable or non-conventional sources of energy. Similarly, the guiding 
framework prior to the EA 2003 did not have any specific provision for enabling rural 
electrification, which was the responsibility of state electricity boards (SEBs) created under 
the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. However, the enactment of EA 2003 changed the legal and 
regulatory framework for the renewable energy sector. The Act provides for policy 
formulation by the Government of India and mandates state electricity regulatory 
commissions to take steps to promote renewable and non-conventional sources of energy 
within their area of jurisdiction. Further, EA 2003 explicitly mentions the formulation of a 
national electricity policy (NEP), a national tariff policy, and a plan for the development of 
power systems to ensure optimal utilization of all resources including renewable sources of 
energy. The Act has also created several other enabling provisions to accelerate the 
development of renewable-energy-based generation and also lays special emphasis on rural 
electrification. The Act mandates the central government to formulate policies permitting 
stand-alone systems, including systems based on renewable and non-conventional energy, 
for rural electrification.  
 
The key Sections of EA 2003 are summarized below. 
 
Electricity 
Act 2003
Section 61(h)
Tariff regulatiuons
Section 86(1)(e)
Cogeneration & 
generation of electricity 
from RE by sale to any 
person
Section 3 
National 
Electricity Policy 
and Tariff Plan
Section 4
Standalone systems 
& use of renewable 
energy sources for 
rural electrification
Section 5
Empowers local 
community/ 
panchayats for local 
distribution in rural 
areas
Section 6
Obligates State & 
Central 
Government to 
make joint efforts to 
implement rural 
electrification
Section 14
Framework for 
generation & 
Distribution
8 proviso: No license 
for generation & 
distribution in rural 
areas
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2.3 Rural Electrification Policy 
 
In compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the central government 
notified the Rural Electrification Policy on 23August 2006. This policy aims at 
 providing access to electricity to all households by 2009, 
 providing quality and reliable power supply at reasonable rates, and 
 ensuring minimum lifeline consumption of 1 unit/household/day as a merit good 
by 2012.  
 
The policy recommends grid connectivity as the primary way of electrification of villages. 
However, where grid connectivity is neither feasible nor cost-effective; off-grid solutions 
based on stand-alone systems may be developed. Further, where neither stand-alone 
systems nor grid connectivity is feasible, isolated lighting technologies such as solar lanterns 
may be adopted. The policy also advocates utilization of non-conventional sources of 
energy, even where grid connectivity exists, after evaluating their cost-effectiveness. With 
• Empowers central government to formulate two policies: tariff plan and National Electricity Policy.
• Also empowers CEA to prepare a National Electricity Plan.
Section 3
• Mandates the central government to formulate policies for stand-alone systems utlizing renewable 
and non-conventional energy sources.
• Section 2(63) of EA 2003 defines stand-alone systems as electricity systems to distribute power to 
specifies areas without connection to grid.
Section 4
• Mandates the central government to formulate a policy for empowering panchayat institutions and 
local community to purchase power and manage its distribution in rural areas. To make rural 
electrification effective, such policy measures shall focus on decentralized distribution of electricity 
involving panvhayats, NGOs, cooperative societies, and users associations.
Section 5
• Amends EA 2003 obligating the state and central governments to make joint efforts to implement 
policies for rural electrification.
Section 6
• Read with section 5 of EA 2003 provides that ‘Appropriate Commission on recommendation by 
Appropriate Government shall exempt local authority, Panchayat Institutions, users associations, 
NGOs, cooperative societies, from taking license from Appropriate Commission for distribution of 
electricity in rural areas.’
Section 13
•Provides a framework for generation and distribution of electricity in rural areas.
• 8 proviso Section 14 read with Section 4 of EA 2003 provides that a person undertaking generation 
based on renewable and non-conventional energy sources and distribution of electricity in rural areas 
specified by state government shall not require any license.
Section 14
•Prescribes the philosophy to be followed by state electricity regulatory commissions while 
determining tariffs stating that the Commission shall be guided by promotional aspects as regards 
renewable energy sources.
Section 61(h)
Enabling provisions under the Electricity Act, 2003 
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the aim of fulfilling this objective, the policy mandated state governments to prepare and 
notify a rural electrification plan. 
 
Because RGGVY was initiated a year before the Rural Electrification Policy (2006), the 
national rural electrification programme was adjusted to address the provisions of the 
policy. 
 
2.4 Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana 
The Ministry of Power’s flagship programme, namely RGGVY, for rural electricity 
infrastructure and household electrification was launched in April 2005 and is being 
implemented through the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC). The scheme aims to 
achieve the goal of providing electricity to all households by providing capital subsidy 
amounting to 90% of the overall cost of a project. The infrastructure under RGGVY includes 
a rural electricity distribution backbone (REDB) with 33/11 kV (or 66/11 kV) substations of 
adequate capacity and lines to be established in blocks where these do not exist and village 
electrification infrastructure (VEI), which involves electrification of un-electrified villages 
and habitations. The scheme provides for a distribution transformer of appropriate capacity 
in such villages and habitations and decentralized distributed generation (DDG) based on 
conventional and non-conventional energy sources where grid supply is not feasible or not 
cost-effective.  
 
It is proposed to continue RGGVY during the 12thFive-Year Plan (2012–17) with 90% capital 
subsidy.1 During the Plan, the scheme aims to cover all remaining habitations and all 
households.2 It is also proposed to increase the electricity load for below-the-poverty-line 
(BPL) households from 40–60 watts to 240 watts and to provide lamps based on light-
emitting diodes (LED) to each BPL household. The Plan also proposes a separate new 
scheme for productive loads, mainly agricultural loads. 
 
2.5 Decentralized Distributed Generation (DDG) Scheme 
RGGVY has set aside Rs 5400 million for subsidizing, through a scheme for DDG, 
electrification of hamlets and habitations not being covered under the scheme on account of 
their remote locations.3 
 
Decentralized distributed generation aims to deploy suitable locally available technologies 
for generation of electricity and distributing it to nearby hamlets or habitations. By nature, 
such projects rely more on small hydro and renewable sources. The Ministry of Power has 
published a set of guidelines consisting of a standardized format for preparation of DDG 
projects and guidelines for procurement of goods and services for implementing those 
projects. The scheme aims at identifying developers who will meet the electricity 
requirements of such villages and hamlets sustainably for five years and selecting those who 
require the least funding assistance. 
 
                                                          
1
http://powermin.nic.in/JSP_SERVLETS/jsp/newsdis.jsp 
2
As against the target, electrification works in 1,05,851 un/de-electrified villages have been completed and 
2,01,18,431 free electricity connections to BPL households have been released under RGGVY (as of 
30/09/2012) 
3
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/efeatures.aspx?relid=82077 
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2.5.1 Salient features of the RGGVY-DDG scheme guidelines 
The salient features of the DDG guidelines issued in 2009 and subsequent amendments to 
the guidelines are summarized below.  
 
Overall framework 
 Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) is the nodal agency for implementing DDG, and 
the capital subsidy for eligible projects is to be routed through REC.  
 The technology suitable for DDG will be specified. The choices include both 
conventional sources (diesel generator sets) and local renewable sources, based on their 
cost-effectiveness and availability in required quantities. 
 The projects of DDG will be owned by the state government, which, in turn, would 
decide the implementing agency for the state: either a state renewable energy 
development agency (SREDA) or the department responsible for promoting renewable 
energy, a state electricity utility, 
or a central public-sector 
undertaking (CPSU). 
 The projects under the scheme 
will be subjected to a three-tier 
quality monitoring mechanism. 
 The Rural Electrification 
Corporation will be paid service 
charges amounting to 1% of the 
project cost for developing the 
implementation framework, pre- 
and post-award appraisal and 
evaluation, and monitoring and 
supervision as per the three-tier 
quality control mechanism. 
 State implementing agencies and 
CPSUs will be paid service 
charges amounting to 8% and 
9% of the project cost 
respectively for meeting 
implementation expenditure, 
additional monitoring costs as 
per the first tier of the quality 
control mechanism, and service 
charges to be paid to developer 
towards meeting the cost of 
providing power for five years. 
 
Selection of a village or hamlet 
 The state agency or department promoting RE will finalize the names of villages or 
hamlets to be electrified through DDG.  
 Villages comprising migrating or floating population or those with fewer than a 
hundred households will not be covered. However, the villages covered earlier under 
RVE with solar home lighting systems and those connected to grid (but without 
electricity supply) will be covered. Priority will be given to villages likely to remain 
unconnected to the grid in next 5–7 years (so that the investment on DDG is not wasted) 
and the possibility of clustering will be explored to the extent possible. 
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Selection of technology  
 Both conventional (diesel generator sets) and non-conventional options are eligible. Site-
specific choices will be made subject to sufficient availability of resources. Where 
resources are surplus, more electricity may be generated without any additional subsidy 
and supplied to the grid (again without any additional subsidy). 
 Infrastructure should be grid compatible so that the investment will continue to be 
useful once a village is connected to the grid. 
 
Project financing and payment pattern 
 Financial assistance for implementing DDG projects includes the following items. 
 Capital cost comprising plant equipment, accessories, civil works (excluding land 
cost), Public Distribution Network (PDN) with necessary control equipment, initial 
capital cost of plantations (for biomass-based projects), and non-domestic loads 
specified by the implementing agency 
 Revenue cost of spare parts for five years of operation excluding labour and 
consumables 
 Cost of providing power for 5years taking into account the amount recovered from 
households for supplying electricity at the tariff (not less than that prevailing in the 
neighbourhood) decided by the state implementing agency as identified in the 
detailed project report (DPR) 
 Soft cost of pre-selection of villages, technology, and preparation of DPR as well as 
the cost of social engineering  
 
 Financial assistance: 90% of the total project cost as subsidy to the implementing agency; 
the rest should be arranged by the implementing agency or taken as loan from REC or 
any other financial institution. 
 
 Pattern of payment  
 70% of the capital cost until commissioning will be reimbursed in phases, the 
repayment being linked to the completion of project milestones. 
 The remaining30% of the capital cost will be paid back over five years from 
commissioning (including 6% interest) 
 The cost of providing power will be reimbursed annually taking into account the 
amount recovered from village households by the implementing agency from its service 
charges (subject to a maximum of 8%–9% of the project cost). A later amendment 
mentions that if this gap exceeds, the amount may be funded out of the subsidy; 
however, it is not clear how this could be done later. 
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Approval and implementation                             
                                                                             DDG Scheme – Approval Process 
 An implementation 
support group (ISG) 
created by MoP will 
coordinate and supervise 
implementation of the 
scheme as per the 
guidelines and the process 
of approval. 
 Implementing agencies 
will assist project 
developers in acquiring 
land and social engineering 
(community mobilization 
and awareness creation).  
 Eligible project developers 
will be state agencies, 
technology suppliers, 
corporate houses, self-help 
groups (SHGs), users 
associations, individuals, 
registered societies, 
cooperatives, panchayats, 
local bodies, and their 
consortia or special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) or 
joint ventures (JVs) and so on.   
 The developers will be selected on the basis of tenders with bids in two parts: the first 
part will cover the capital cost and the second part will cover the cost of providing 
power for 5years; the second part cannot exceed the service charges (8% of the project 
costs for state governments and 9% for CPSUs) of implementing agencies.  
 A tripartite agreement will be signed between REC, the implementing agency, and the 
project developer setting out the commitments and conditions for the RGGVY-DDG sub 
component. 
 The project developer will implement the project on BOMT basis (build, operate, 
maintain, and transfer) supplying electricity for 6–8hours a day for 25days in a month 
and collecting tariff from villagers for 5years. Thereafter, the project – in working 
condition along with all the replaced parts– will be handed over to the state government. 
 
Miscellaneous 
 The project developer ‘will be permitted’ to mobilize additional support or funds. 
 A consultant will prepare the DPR estimating electricity load, plant size required, etc. 
 If grid reaches the village within five years, power can be exported to the grid or 
imported from the grid ‘as and when required’. 
 A specified amount will be paid for each light point or for each month, a method 
preferred to conventional meters. The implementing agency will issue guidelines on 
electricity charges to the project developer. 
 The implementing agency can explore possibilities of earning carbon credits by bundling 
certified or verified emission reductions (CERs or VERs) for a number of villages.  
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3 KEY ISSUES IN THE DDG GUIDELINES 
To understand the issues with the present DDG guidelines and reasons for the lukewarm 
response from the private sector, selected DDG projects in a few potential states, namely 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and West Bengal, were visited. Detailed consultations were held with 
key stakeholders (SERCs, SNAs, DISCOMs, manufacturers, project developers, and subject 
experts) to gain valuable insights based on their vast experience in formulating DDG 
projects and implementing and operating them in the field. The major learnings and insights 
gained are summarized below. 
3.1 Overall Framework 
 
 Decentralized distributed generation is more of a government-driven and -operated 
mechanism. A 90% capital subsidy, although intended to attract the private sector, 
actually limits the investment potential for the private sector developer significantly. 
Raising the remaining 10% as the state government’s share or as loan from REC, the 
implementing agency, or financial institutions limits the role of the private sector even 
further, reducing it to that of a technology supplier. Therefore, one of the foremost 
issues with the DDG guidelines, as identified by the stakeholders, is the overall 
packaging of incentives in the framework. 
 According to the guidelines, DDG projects are to be owned by the state government 
and implemented on BOMT basis. This model requires the project developer to 
maintain the power plant for 5 years and then transfer it to the state government, which 
means that the project developer runs the plant in the initial 5years during which a 
plant usually experiences maximum problems—once its operation stabilizes, the plant 
is transferred. This condition offers little motivation to the developer to resolve the 
teething problems adequately because that investment will bring no returns. The same 
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condition also prevents the developer from earning a profit after streamlining plant 
operations. This is the second most critical issue in the framework as identified by the 
stakeholders. 
 The present scheme focuses heavily on capital subsidy to take care of capital costs and 
is entirely silent on operational costs, wages, working capital, etc.Providing90% capital 
subsidy, by itself, might not serve to ensure that a DDG plant is viable. Especially in the 
case of biomass-based projects, the initial capital expenditure is lower than that in the 
case of solar PV projects but the operating costs (fuel, wages, and maintenance) are 
much higher. It is obvious that the capital subsidy mechanism alone is insufficient to 
ensure viability of projects with higher operating costs. 
 The cap on service charges or fees to the state implementing agencies (8% of the project 
cost for state agencies and 9% for CPSUs)is likely to be inadequate in bridging the 
viability gap between the cost of providing power for 5 years and revenue collection at 
the pre-determined tariff from users. For example, in the case of biomass-based projects 
the viability gap will be far wider than what can be bridged with 8% of the project cost. 
Secondly, this amount is to be used for covering the expenses related not only to 
implementation and overall supervision but also those incurred onthe3-tier quality 
control mechanism. Thus, the provision is insufficient to achieve the desired objective.  
 Although the concept of a3-tier quality monitoring mechanism looks good, its effective 
implementation appears doubtful considering that the associated costs have to be 
carved out from service charges or fees paid to the implementing agency.  
 
3.2 Village/hamlet Selection 
 
 The state agency draws up a list of villages and hamlets to be electrified through DDG 
taking into consideration the possibility of such villages being connected to the grid in 
the next5–7 years. However, it is felt that this responsibility should have been given 
jointly to state utilities or DISCOMs and the state agency promoting renewable energy 
because a utility or a DISCOM is better informed about the plans to extend the grid.  
 Although the guidelines emphasizes clustering of hamlets or un-electrified villages, 
limiting the choice to only those habitations that are not likely to be connected to the 
grid over the next 5–7years makes it difficult to identify the villages to be included in a 
cluster. Thus, clustering looks only a distant possibility. The consequence is that since 
only a single village or a hamlet, or at the most 2–3 adjoining hamlets, are to be covered, 
only a few households need to be served, which means that only a small DDG plant 
would be necessary. This has two adverse implications for the viability of business. 
First, small DDG plants are less attractive to the private player; second, the low energy 
requirements– since only domestic lighting needs are to be met – mean a low capacity 
utilization factor (CUF). The result is very high cost of electricity generation, and the 
higher the cost of generation and supply, the more vulnerable the operation once grid-
supplied electricity enters the picture. Higher costs also mean lower margins for the 
equipment supplier or for any local enterprise or entrepreneur that would like to act as 
an energy service company (ESCO). These interlinked factors make it difficult to 
manage and maintain a DDG plant sustainably. 
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3.3  Selection of Technology for DDG 
 
The present approach to technology selection is far too prescriptive and limited. It also fails 
to consider various technologies suitable for difference sizes or capacities, and also does not 
relate the size of a DDG plant to a given technology. The guidelines need to avoid imposing 
a particular technology; instead, they should create an enabling framework. 
 The technology decision tool given in the present guidelines puts biofuels ahead of 
biomass (gasifier) or biogas. Biomass-combustion-based plants are suitable for large 
(megawatt-size) capacities whereas biofuels, community-level biogas, or solar PV may 
be the more feasible or preferred options for smaller capacities. 
 The guidelines also mention that the infrastructure needs to be grid compatible. Here 
too, the capacity or size of a DDG plant might play a decisive role for evacuation of 
power in small quantities in a generally unstable rural grid, especially below 33kV/11kV 
substations. 
3.4 Sustainability of DDG Projects on Grid Extension 
 
At present, it is almost impossible for any RE-based DDG power plant to survive once grid 
power reaches the project site, mainly because tariffs for grid-supplied power are low. For 
consumers with low power consumption (in the case of multi-layered tariffs), for BPL 
households, and for such categories as agriculture, the tariffs are even lower. As a result, as 
soon as grid-supplied power is available, consumers prefer to switch to the grid and 
abandon the DDG project.  
 Although the guidelines mention that ‘if 
grid power reaches the village before 5years 
then the power produced from the DDG 
project can be exported to the grid as and 
when required’, the price that such 
exported power would fetch is far from 
clear. Secondly, the quantum of power 
generated and supplied (sold),that is the 
CUF of a DDG plant, a crucial parameter 
for the cost of generation, will be lower if 
there is no assurance that power 
generated by the DDG plant would be 
bought, and bought at a reasonable price, 
once the plant is integrated with the grid.  
 
This uncertainty puts a big question mark on the viability of the DDG plant in the event 
of grid reaching the site. 
 Given the vast difference between the costs of generation using RE-based DDG and the 
DISCOM tariff applicable to rural customers; it is inevitable that customers would 
Tariff to be fixed based as 
a flat charge, but no 
guidelines and would 
become null and void on 
grid connection
Tariff parity? Grid 
tariff far too low
Power can be 
exported to grid, but 
at what rate?
Sustainability of DDG project on grid extension 
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switch over to grid as soon as it reaches the project site. Further, it has been noticed that 
as soon as consumers get used to electricity generated through DDG, the demand for 
grid extension becomes more strident as consumers become aware of the advantages of 
electricity and the low cost of grid electricity—which makes private-sector developers 
generally wary of getting into DDG. 
 If it is assumed that grid extension is inevitable in most parts of the country, at what 
rate should a DDG project supply the electricity to consumers and then to the grid once 
it is available? To ensure that DDG is viable, the guidelines recommend a fixed tariff 
based on the number of electric points or for each month, rather than that based on 
metered consumption. The guidelines also leave it to the implementing agency to 
devise ways for fixing these tariffs. However, once a plant is connected to the grid, 
these tariffs no longer apply and are replaced by those fixed by the state electricity 
regulatory commission, as is mandatory. 
 
This uncertainties related to the operation of a DDG plant and the condition that, on 
integration with the grid, power has to be sold at the rates applicable to grid electricity 
deter private developers from investing in DDG projects. Also, the uncertainty regarding 
metering, billing, and collection for the power generated and exported to the grid creates 
risks that are nearly impossible to manage. 
 
3.5 Project Financing and Payment Pattern 
 
 The capital cost of a DDG project includes civil work, the cost of which varies from 
plant to plant. The guidelines are silent on the type and requirement of civil structures 
for different types of DDG technologies as well as on the size or scale of DDG plants, 
whether small-scale plants of a few kilowatts or large, megawatt-size plants. 
 The guidelines stipulate that the charges for providing power will be paid annually to 
the project developer by the implementing agency. The amount is expected to be paid 
out of the service charges or fees received by the implementing agency, which are fixed 
at 8% of the project cost for a state agency and 9% for CPSUs.  
 
3.6 Programme Management: Approval and Implementation Process 
 
 Although the guidelines lay down elaborate procedures for approving DDG projects 
and for implementing them, the guidelines are silent on the need to adhere to strict 
timelines in executing those procedures and taking decisions, and on fallback options in 
the event of delays. Such disregard for time-bound actions results in delays in 
approving projects and in implementing them, leading to cost overruns. 
 The guidelines are vague on the role and responsibility for social engineering and 
obtaining the required clearances for the project site. This lack of clarity not only delays 
a project but also increases its costs and affects the cost-sharing mechanism—yet 
another deterrent to developers from the private sector.  
 The current institutional mechanism for implementing and monitoring the DDG 
scheme consists of the following components: the Implementation Support Group (ISG) 
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of MoP, REC, the project implementing agency (PIA),project developers, and 
technology providers. However, most of the decisions are made by the ISG or REC 
while the PIA is saddled with the onerous responsibility of making DDG a reality. 
 Because DPRs are channelled through the PIA to REC and then to the ISG for final 
approval, it takes a long time to get the approval. By that time the validity period of the 
tenders or bids floated on the basis of a preliminary DPR is usually over, leading to 
further revisions of time and costs. As a result, although more than 275projects have 
been sanctioned, fewer than a dozen – mostly based on solar PV and all of them in 
Andhra Pradesh – could be implemented on the ground after getting a final formal 
approval from the ISG.  
 The project developer has to submit a DPR while seeking the approval. For this 
purpose, the developer has to undertake a detailed survey of the proposed village or 
villages to choose the right technology and to assess the overall viability of the project. 
Although the guidelines allow the cost of preparing a DPR as part of the project cost 
while seeking financial assistance, project developers maintain that it is difficult, even 
impractical, to expect a project developer to invest in conducting an in-depth field 
survey, an expensive proposition in terms of time and money, without any assurance 
that the project would be approved—and approved in time.  
 The guidelines stipulate that the project developer be chosen by the implementing 
agency based on a two-part tendering process involving separate bids for(a) capital cost 
and (b) cost of providing power for 5 years after commissioning. However, the second 
part cannot be more than 8% of the first part. 
 
 
 
3.7 Miscellaneous 
 
 The guidelines recommend that ‘for DDG projects, a flat rate in terms of money to be 
paid for each light point or for each month is a more practical way of setting the tariff 
than the classical sale of electricity/kWh’. The guidelines also mention that ‘the 
DELAYS & 
COST 
OVERRUN
• lack of aderence to a strict timeline
• lack of clarity on role and responsibility of social engineering and project site clearance
• the guidelines suggest that DPR must be channelled through PIA to REC and reach ISG, which invloves a 
long time, surpassing the validity period of tender, future correction of which adds to the time and cost 
PROJECT 
APPROVAL 
&IMPLEMEN
TATION  
ISSUES
• the entire decision-making lies with ISG and REC, and ISG has to make the whole DDG project happen—
an uncertain propsition at best
• DPR preparation requires a survey to be conducted of the village, involving a lot of time and money—with 
no assurance of the project being sanctioned
TENDERING 
& SELECTION
• tendering is to be done based on two components: capital cost and cost of providing power for 5 years 
after commissioning. However, the cap laid on the second component raises a lot of ambiguity amongst 
project developers
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concerned Implementing Agency will issue guidelines for electricity charge to the project 
developers. However, so far, there seems to be no effort towards bridging the viability 
gap between the income from for project and the cost of providing power for 5 years. 
Instead, the guidelines maintain that the viability gap should be bridged by using some 
amount from the service charges or fees paid to the implementing agency. However, 
whether such an arrangement would be honoured by the implementing agency – and 
honoured in time – is a moot question, which jeopardizes profitable operation of a DDG 
plant.  
 The guidelines mention the need to go beyond lighting and recommend inclusion of 
some non-productive workloads and also mention that such workload can be part of 
the project cost for financial assistance (capital subsidy). Such a provision, although it 
allows higher total project costs, remains unclear about what can be included in the 
capital cost and whether it can be capped. 
 The guidelines do say that the implementing agency can explore the possibility of 
raising addition funds by claiming carbon credits for a project in the form of CERs and 
VERs. However, the guidelines are silent on who should bear the associated soft costs 
of preparing the elaborate documentation that is required in claiming carbon credits 
and also the transaction costs. Secondly, the insistence on flat charges instead of billing 
metered consumption can weaken the case for CERs or VERs, which generally demand 
rigorous MRV mechanism to ensure that the emission reductions are real and 
additional.  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
 
The present guidelines focus strongly on subsidizing the capital costs of a project but fail to 
provide a clear ownership or equity structure for attracting participation from the private 
sector. Typically, such participation or intervention is expected to bring in greater efficiency 
and optimal utilization of resources to make the project more cost-effective. However, in the 
case of DDG projects, capital subsidy has failed to attract the private sector. Besides, given 
the technical and operational issues mentioned above, a DDG project may not be able to 
meet the requirement of uninterrupted operation, especially in the event of electricity grid 
reaching the villages. Although the guidelines emphasize that the project infrastructure be 
grid compatible, they are unclear on how a project developer or a private sector investor can 
ensure that the project remains profitable even after being integrated with the grid.  
 
The major barriers to private-sector participation in the present DDG scheme, in light of past 
experience and stakeholder consultations, are as follows. 
 Lack of substantial volume and long-term business due to the BOMT framework, 
90% capital subsidy, and uncertainty of business after grid connectivity 
 Smaller plants due to the inability to make sizeable clusters because of the grid 
reaching most census villages (although in many cases there is no power supply) 
 The high cost of generation using renewable-energy systems making it impossible to 
compete with the prevailing grid tariff 
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 Cap on bridging the gap between the cost of generation and income from revenue 
collection even with 90% subsidy for most renewable technologies and even more so 
for biomass-based systems where the capital costs are low but operating costs are 
high 
 Poorly defined roles or responsibilities of the many players, delays in sanctioning 
projects, cost overruns, and lack of guidance on payment to bridge the viability gap 
 Uncertainty of business, and hence in cash flow, coupled with non-parity with grid 
tariff, making it impossible to make a bankable business proposal 
 
The chief conclusion from the consultations carried out with key stakeholders including 
DDG project developers is straightforward: ensuring sizeable business along with 
profitability and long-term business viability of a DDG plant should be at the core of the 
scheme. This focus will be crucial in creating interest among project developers and 
attracting private-sector investment for rural electrification. It was also felt that DDG cannot 
supply electricity to consumers at DISCOM tariffs, even with 90% capital subsidy. There is a 
need to explore different financing options such as combining capital and revenue subsidy, 
long-term power purchase agreement(PPA) on feed-in tariff(FIT), and reducing the burden 
on DISCOMs through central financial assistance or RECs (renewable energy certificates) or 
additional cess on other categories of a DISCOM’s consumers. Apart from clustering, 
widening the customer base might be good idea for promoting RE-based DDG under the 
emerging scenario of large-scale electrification (grid extension) envisaged in RGGVY. A 
large number of villages, which now have access to electricity, are under-electrified, that is 
they receive unreliable power supply and that too for only a few hours.  
 
These issues have serious implications not only for effective implementation of DDG 
projects but also for attracting private-sector investments, which is essential for faster, more 
efficient and economical development of the sector. 
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4 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN DDG GUIDELINES 
Based on the insights gained during field visits to selected DDG projects and consultations 
with key stakeholders and extensive analysis of policy and regulatory framework for rural 
electrification in the country, some possible improvements in the existing DDG guidelines 
are suggested here, aimed at enhancing private-sector participation in the scheme. 
 
4.1 Overall Approach and Framework 
 
The overall approach to and framework of implementing the DDG scheme need to be 
looked at afresh to make the scheme amenable to large-scale private-sector participation. We 
suggest that the following issues be addressed while redesigning or restructuring the 
scheme to make it attractive for private sector investment. 
 
4.2 Increased Ownership Interest of the Project Developer 
 
With the present structure of 90 : 10 capital subsidies : state loan ratio in place, the role of the 
private sector has been limited to that of a technology supplier whereas it is important to 
ensure significant buy-in of project developers to keep them seriously interested in the 
business. Private-sector participation is best attracted when project developers have an 
equity stake since their primary business interest is to maximize the return on equity (RoE). 
 
The financing structure of the DDG scheme needs to be changed. The government should 
strive to reduce capital subsidy and increase equity investment from the private sector. One 
of the capital structures could be that in which capital subsidy, equity, and debt account for 
respectively 50%, 30%, and 20% of the project cost. Similarly, equity investors should be 
assured a RoE of 14%–16% on their investment. This will bring the investment structure in 
off-grid rural electrification in line with power sector policies. Given that DDG or rural 
Increase private role
Role of the project developer should 
be expanded to include 
ownership/equity investment and 
not restricted to that of a technology 
supplier
Profitability over lifetime
Ensuring profitability (RoE) during 
the operational life irrespective of 
the status of grid connectivity; 
revenue subsidy to be provided 
wherever required
Tariff parity
Consumers to get electricity at the 
tariff determined for the area by the 
state electricity regulatory 
commission
Regulatory acceptance
Strong contractual arrangement for 
both generation and distribution 
with appropriate regulatory 
oversight under 8th Proviso of 
Section 14
Expanding applicability
Expand applicability of scheme to 
under-electrified villages or hamlets 
to enhance possibility of clustering 
to scale-up to sizeable capacity
Technology selection
Improved decision-making for 
technology choice based on 
resource as well as size or scale of 
DDG plants
Sustainability of operations
Sustainable operation of project in 
island mode as well as grid-
connected conditions to ensure 
reliable power supply to covered 
habitations
Roles and responsibilities
Improved clarity of roles and 
responsibilities of key actors 
implementing the scheme and 
reduce red-tapism to smoothen 
administrative process of 
implementation
Financing
Special purpose vehicle approach 
may be explored by creating a green 
fund 
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electrification as a business is more risky than conventional generation, additional incentives 
are required for those who willing to undertake that business.  
 
Further, debt funding would ensure 
increased scrutiny of the project by 
an independent agency with strong 
interest in the business activity. Such 
scrutiny will ensure increased 
ownership by the project developer 
as well as the commitment to keep 
the project operational so that it can 
provide electricity throughout the 
lifetime of the project. Return on 
equity and interest on debt might 
widen the viability gap, but it should 
be noted that even with capital 
subsidy of 90% the projects are not 
financially viable because the cost of 
generation continues to be far higher 
than DISCOM tariff. As a result, a 
revenue subsidy mechanism would 
be required in any case.  
 
 
However, the proposed financing structure would ensure that plants are maintained 
properly because significant business interests are involved and the ultimate goal of 
generation and distribution of electricity over the lifetime of any RE-based DDG project 
would be achieved. 
 
Further, the implementation model for the project should be build, own, operate, and 
maintain (BOOM) over the life of the project rather than the BOMT model preferred by the 
current guidelines. This change will ensure continued and long-term involvement of the 
private sector in the project. 
 
4.3 Profitability of DDG Projects over Lifetime 
 
Under the prevailing circumstances of a low PLF and the vast difference between grid tariff 
and the cost of power generated using RE-based DDG, even a 90% capital subsidy would 
not be sufficient to cover the cost of supplying DDG-based power to rural customers at grid-
based tariffs. As discussed earlier, this gap would be far higher than the present cap of 8% or 
9% mentioned in the guidelines, especially in the case of renewable resources like biomass 
and bio-oil where the variable cost of generation is high. Also, it is neither reasonable nor 
realistic to expect that the implementing agency would pay the project developer this 
difference from its service fees. And even if it does, such payment may adversely affect the 
quality assurance and quality control (QAQC) mechanism mentioned in the guidelines as 
the costs of QAQC are also to be borne through the service fees.  
 
It is obvious that the government will have to put in place an additional and variable 
compensation mechanism to ensure that DDG projects are viable. This additional 
compensation would vary with technology. Therefore, the guidelines also need to establish a 
Increase equity to 
50%
Move fromBOMT to 
BOOM model
Shift from capital to revenue subsidy 
(VGF)
Inclusion of debt funding will have scrutiny making 
projects bankable
Increase ownership and interest 
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mechanism to determine the cost of supplying power through different renewable energy 
sources under various operating conditions and parameters. 
 
4.4 DDG Project Operation on Grid Extension 
 
Experience with DDG in programmes such as VESP shows that RE-based DDG becomes 
defunct or redundant once the customers are connected to the grid because grid-based 
power is cheaper. Although the guidelines mention that DDG should be grid compatible, 
small DDG plants and poor rural infrastructure casts serious doubts on such compatibility 
in reality. Further, the guidelines on technical standards for synchronization of small 
systems with the grid at 400V are yet to be issued by the Central Electricity Authority.  
 
On commercial front, although the guidelines mention that a DDG plant can export power 
to the grid ‘as and when required’, the guidelines do not specify the quantum of assured 
power that would be absorbed in the grid and the price at which that power would be 
procured by the grid. The guidelines need to incorporate these two parameters to assure 
project developers of continued and profitable operation over the lifetime of their projects.  
 
4.5 Expanding Horizon to Cover Under-electrified Villages or Hamlets 
 
Under RGGVY, most of the census villages were covered and grid infrastructure extended 
to these villages in the 11th Five-Year Plan. This coverage, however, makes it difficult to find 
sizeable numbers of ‘un-electrified’ census villages 
for future implementation, making a cluster of 
contiguous un-electrified villages even rarer. At the 
same time, the hamlets or other small settlements, 
variously referred to as padas or bastis, that surround 
these census villages have no access to grid electricity.  
 
On the technology side, very small plants adequate 
for a single village lower the economic viability of the 
business. If the plants are made larger so that they 
can supply power to a few villages and hamlets, the 
projects are likely to be sustainable. For this purpose, 
a DDG plant needs to include under-electrified 
villages along with un-electrified villages and 
hamlets in the coverage area so as to form a sizeable 
cluster of contiguous villages or habitations. 
 
4.6 Robust Criteria for Technology Selection 
 
The DDG technology decision tool, which is part of the present guidelines, ranks biofuel- 
based DDG much higher than that based on biomass gasifiers or biogas. However, it is felt 
that the technology decision tool needs to be modified to take into account the size or scale 
of the RE-based power plant as well. Such a modification becomes particularly important if 
the clustering approach suggested in this report is adopted. Power plants using biofuels, 
biogas, or solar PV can be smaller, 10–50 kW for example, to serve an un-electrified village 
and its associated hamlets; grid-interactive RE-based DDG plants can be larger, 1–2 MW for 
example, and can serve a cluster of un-electrified and under-electrified villages or hamlets 
and would basically work as tail-end augmentation of electricity supply. 
Expanding horizon of coverage 
 
Clustering  of 
electrified, un-
electrified and 
under-electrified
Under-
electrified
Un-electrified
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4.7 Legality of the Structure 
 
The guidelines leave it to the implementing agency to draw up an agreed-upon normative 
and simplified tariff structure for DDG plants in which the tariff would be higher than that 
charged by a DISCOM. However, the Electricity Act, 2003, states that only the electricity 
regulatory commission has the authority to determine tariffs or to set guidelines for 
determining tariffs. This discrepancy needs to be removed.  
 
The scope of regulatory jurisdiction over off-grid generation and supply is not clear either. 
Generally, only grid-connected plants are held to be within the purview of the regulatory 
commission. The source of this ambiguity is Section 14(8) of the Act, which appears to leave 
off-grid generation and supply out of the purview of regulatory oversight. However, this 
interpretation is not correct because Section 14 deals with licensing issues and exempts off-
grid generation and supply from licensing requirements and not from regulatory oversight. 
Further, the only available forum to settle any dispute between the generator and the 
consumer is the electricity regulatory commission. It is essential to clear up this ambiguity 
early and completely. The government should put in place a regulatory framework in future 
DDG policies that will allow planned development, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of DDG schemes. 
 
4.8 Clarity of Roles of Key Actors 
 
The present guidelines fail to specify clearly the roles and responsibilities of key 
stakeholders in the process. The guidelines recommend that un-electrified villages be 
shortlisted by state nodal agencies (SNAs) or other implementing agencies in consultation 
with DISCOMs or SEBs. However, the capability of SNAs to do so is doubtful; since such 
short listing of villages involves issues related to the grid, the list should ideally be drawn 
up by a DISCOM, preferably in consultation with MNRE or an SNA. 
 
With the suggested ’clustering’ approach, it is even more important that such short listing be 
done by a DISCOM, which is more likely to be privy to any plans of extending the grid, 
taking into consideration the possibility of grid extension, transmission infrastructure 
requirement, and the current and future status of electricity supply. 
 
The role of SNAs will be more important in selecting the right RE technology and in 
specifying a suitable size for the power plant. The implementing agency’s role can be to 
ensure greater transparency and time-bound decision-making in implementing the scheme. 
With such widening of the scope of DDG to cover under-electrified villages, the role of 
DISCOM becomes more crucial to the success of the scheme because the PDN is going to be 
finally the DISCOM’s asset, and DDG projects should be seen as an assisting programme 
and mechanism to help DISCOMs to achieve their obligation of providing sufficient and 
reliable power to all customers cost-effectively. 
 
4.9 Adoption of the DGBDF Model for Rural Electrification 
 
From the earlier discussions, it is evident that the future of the DDG scheme lies in ensuring 
a long-term business prospect by ensuring in turn sustainable business operations before 
and after grid extension to the project area. To ensure reliable generation and distribution of 
electricity, DDG project developers need to take on both generation and distribution on 
behalf of DISCOMs instead of confining themselves to generating power and supplying it to 
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off-grid consumers or to the grid once the plant is integrated with the gird. Therefore, we 
believe that in future, DDG projects will have to be promoted as an integrated generation 
and franchisee business, or a distributed-generation-based distributed franchise (DGBDF).  
 
In the DGBDF model, a project developer will not only generate electricity but also 
undertake metering, billing, and collection (MBC) on behalf of the DISCOM within a given 
cluster. Thus the developer will be a generator as well as a franchisee. As a result, the 
developer and the DISCOM would need to draw up two agreements: 
 a PPA for the lifetime of the proposed RE-based DDG power plant 
 a franchisee agreement for MBC on behalf of the DISCOM. 
 
The project developer will commission a generation project in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the PPA and would supply electricity to the local grid by connecting the 
plant at 11kV or above at the substation serving the selected cluster. The DISCOM will pay 
the agreed-upon FIT to the developer. As per the current practice, the DISCOM will 
distribute electricity to rural consumers and the project developer will undertake MBC 
under the franchisee agreement. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD 
Despite the several programmes for rural electrification launched by the Government of 
India, the ambitious goal of electricity to all by 2012 could not be achieved. Providing 
reliable and sufficient electricity appears a distant dream even now. Although RGGVY can 
claim to have taken grid infrastructure to most of the census villages by the end of the 11th 
Five-Year Plan, providing sufficient and reliable electricity remains an elusive and 
challenging task mainly due to the wide demand–supply gap, more than 10%, despite huge 
capacity addition in the last two decades.  
 
The issues identified in the existing DDG guidelines and recommendations to address those 
issues are summarized in the table below. 
 
ISSUES RECOMMENDATIONS 
Overall framework government-driven; 
90% capital subsidy and remaining 10%as state 
government’s share or loan from REC or the 
implementing agency limits the role of the private 
sector to that of a technology supplier. 
Restructure the framework to increase ownership and 
interest of private sector. 
 Limit capital subsidy to 50%. 
 Insist on a minimal equity of 30%. 
 Make up the balance through a debt fund. 
The present build, operate, monitor, and transfer model 
involves 
 ownership by the state government 
 only a small role and interest on part of the project 
developer. 
Move from BOMT to BOOM (build, own, operate, and 
maintain). Ownership of the project developer over the 
project’s lifetime ensures that the plant is operational 
throughout. 
A plant’s operation over its life is uncertain despite 
90% capital subsidy, as the issue of the high operational 
and maintenance costs has not been tacked. 
Provide revenue subsidy as required instead of capital 
subsidy to cover viability gap between grid tariff and 
cost of renewable power generation, e.g. Rs 5–6 per unit 
for biomass-gasifier-based DDG. 
Village selection: state nodal agency to finalize the list 
of villages to be electrified through DDG. 
In order to ensure that investment is not wasted, the 
task of selecting villages must be given to DISCOMs or 
state utilities. 
Although clustering approach is recommended, 
reduced potential for clustering with widespread grid 
extension under RGGVY. Reduces economic viability 
of business owing to low CUF and small plants 
catering to small clusters. 
Expand horizon of coverage: clustering of un-
electrified, under-electrified and even electrified 
villages or hamlets, resulting in larger plants and 
greater business potential. 
Technological decision tool is silent on the size of a 
DDG plant. 
For implementation, it is important to modify the 
technological decision tool to take into account the size 
or scale factor, especially in clustering. 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities of key actors: 
Capability of SNAs to shortlist un-electrified villages 
doubtful. 
DISCOM’s role critical considering grid-related issues; 
may act in consultation with SNA. 
SNA’s role must be confined to renewable energy 
technology selection and plant specifications. 
Implementing agency must ensure greater transparency 
and time-bound decision-making in implementation. 
Guidelines suggest that DDG plants must be grid 
compatible but lack clarity on what happens after grid 
integration or extension. 
CEA must be directed by the government to issue 
technical standards and guidelines for synchronization 
of small RE power plants with grid at 400V.  
Sustainability and profitability are uncertain, lowering 
the project’s viability on grid extension. 
Need clear guidance on this with assured purchase of 
power (both quantum and price). Guidelines for price 
under the DDG mode and bringing it under some 
regulatory system. 
 
Therefore, for achieving the goal of electricity for all in its true sense and making rural 
electrification a massive mission with large-scale private-sector participation for effective 
implementation of the DDG scheme in future, the following essential tasks need to be 
undertaken on priority. 
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 Widening the horizon of coverage by including under-electrified villages or hamlets 
to make sizeable clusters. 
 Bringing in regulatory interventions to promote business models (such as the 
DGBDF model proposed here) by bringing in not only clarity and assurance of long-
term business profitability but also legality of the proposed model.  
 Bringing in parity between grid tariff and renewable-energy-based tariff by 
providing generation-based financial assistance instead of capital subsidy to ensure 
that DDG projects are not only installed but also remain operational with reasonable 
profitability over their lifetime. 
 Estimating the rational cost of electricity supply to rural areas to obtain a realistic 
estimate of the viability gap between the cost of generating power through various 
renewable-based DDG systems and income from supplying such power. 
 Estimating the cost of electricity supply through DDG based on various sources of 
renewable energy under various sets of parameters to calculate the amount needed 
to bridge the viability gap and developing a mechanism to ensure that the amount is 
paid to the project developer through appropriate regulatory interventions by way of 
FIT as mentioned earlier. 
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